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ABSTRACT
In American Legion v. American Humanist Association, the Court
addressed the Establishment Clause issues surrounding a longstand-
ing Latin cross veteran’s memorial located on public property. Al-
though the Court upheld the memorial with a narrow ruling, an
unresolved issue lurking beneath the surface of passive display cases
like American Legion is whether a government dismantling of a long-
standing religious symbol might itself, under certain circumstances,
constitute an independent Establishment Clause violation. Such a dis-
mantling of a religious symbol built decades earlier, before the property
became publicly owned, might well be considered a government act
hostile to religion, especially as America becomes increasingly secular
and government actors demonstrate increasing hostility to religious in-
stitutions and beliefs.
Given the continual drift toward secularism in American society,
this Article uses the decision in American Legion to explore the ques-
tion of whether government exclusion of religion from the public square
in favor of a secularism baseline violates the neutrality doctrine and
constitutes its own Establishment Clause infringement. The Court has
never ruled that a government exclusion of religion violates the First
Amendment, but as American Legion demonstrates, the necessity of
such a ruling may well arise in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In American Legion v. American Humanist Association,1 the Court
had an opportunity to define the scope and meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause. The case involved the passive display of a Latin cross
now situated on government land.2 Given the confusion and uncer-
tainty in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, hope existed that
American Legion might finally settle some big questions: What does it
mean to have an establishment of religion? What is the real concern of
the Establishment Clause? And who is the Clause meant to serve?
Although the opportunity existed for such resolutions, hope was
not high that the Court would finally agree on such fundamental is-
sues. Too much polarization has characterized the Court’s Establish-
ment Clause opinions and the mistaken legacies of the Wall of
Separation metaphor still hang over that jurisprudence. Moreover, the
social and cultural setting underlying Establishment Clause conflicts
is in a state of change. American society is becoming less religious and
more secular. Christianity no longer exerts a dominant hold on a dem-
ocratic society that continues to move away from religious affiliations.
In light of the changing social and political conditions underlying
Establishment Clause cases, American Legion offers a chance to con-
1. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
2. Id. at 2074.
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template an Establishment Clause issue not directly presented to the
Court in that case. The American Humanist Association argued, and
the Fourth Circuit held, that the cross violated the Establishment
Clause.3 If the Supreme Court had upheld the Fourth Circuit, the
cross would have had to be dismantled and removed from its site.
However, such an action probably would have had just the effect that
the endorsement test seeks to avoid—the alienation of individuals
(e.g., religious believers), who would be made to feel as second-class
citizens and outsiders.
This Article will explore the meaning and application of the Estab-
lishment Clause in contemporary society through an analysis of the
issue of state-conducted dismantling of longstanding religious dis-
plays. The Establishment Clause issues surrounding such displays
have historically been evaluated from the standpoint of government
maintenance of those displays, not from the standpoint of government
removal of displays built by private parties. But the removal of dis-
plays built during more religious eras raises issues not yet addressed
by the Court, with one question being whether affirmative govern-
ment exclusion of religion might violate the Establishment Clause.
The constitutional issue in American Legion arose decades after
the cross was constructed when there were no objections to the dis-
play.4 The display was first erected during an era in which Christian-
ity was far more prominent in America but was litigated in a time of
rising secularism. And yet, current Establishment Clause doctrines
still embrace an unstated assumption that secularists and religious
objectors are still minorities subject to the majoritarian dictates of
Christian activists.
American Legion implicated an issue the Court bypassed earlier in
Salazar v. Buono, where it avoided having to directly address the con-
stitutional issue of whether a cross erected on government land as a
memorial to WWI veterans violated the Establishment Clause.5 But
while the Salazar Court left intact the lower court’s ruling that the
cross constituted an improper establishment, no court has addressed
whether the destruction of that cross might itself have violated the
Establishment Clause.
II. THE AMERICAN LEGION DECISION
The American Legion facts in many ways mirror the facts in
Salazar v. Buono. In both cases, the government did not build or initi-
3. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 874 F.3d
195, 212 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist
Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 451 (2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 451 (2018), rev’d and re-
manded sub nom. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
4. Id.
5. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
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ate the cross memorial and it was not until decades later that any
Establishment Clause objections were made against the memorials.
A. Facts of the Case
In 1918 a group of private citizens started raising money to erect a
giant cross monument to honor forty-nine area soldiers killed in World
War I.6 In 1922 the American Legion assumed control of the project
and completed it in 1925.7 The monument, in the shape of a Latin
cross (the Cross), stands thirty-two feet high in the median of a three-
way highway intersection in Bladensburg, Maryland.8 Due to safety
concerns arising from the placement of the Cross in the middle of a
busy traffic median, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Plan-
ning Commission, a state parks agency, acquired title to the land on
which the Cross sat and assumed care and maintenance of the monu-
ment in 1961.9
Currently, the Cross stands in a traffic island taking up one-third
of an acre at the busy intersection of two highways.10 The American
Legion’s symbol is affixed near the top of the Cross and a nine-foot
wide plaque listing the names of the soldiers memorialized by the
Cross is located at the base.11 The Cross is also part of a memorial
park honoring veterans, known as Veterans Memorial Park.12 Monu-
ments in the park include a War of 1812 memorial, a World War II
memorial, a Korean and Vietnam veterans memorial, and a Septem-
ber 11th memorial walkway.13
No objections were made to the Cross until 2012, when the Ameri-
can Humanist Association lodged a complaint with the Commission.
The American Humanist Association and a group of individuals who
were offended by the Cross commenced litigation in 2014.14 Claiming
the Cross violated the Establishment Clause, the plaintiffs asked a
federal court to demolish the Cross or at least remove its arms.15 The
district court upheld the Cross against this challenge, but the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled it breached the wall of separation be-
tween church and state, violating the Establishment Clause.16
6. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2074–76.
9. Id. at 2078.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2077.
12. Id. at 2077.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2074.
15. Id.
16. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 874 F.3d
195, 212 (4th Cir. 2017).
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The issue in American Legion in many ways arose from the ques-
tion the Supreme Court left unanswered in the 2010 case of Salazar v.
Buono.17 Like American Legion, Salazar involved the issue of a large
Latin cross built by private parties to commemorate the loss of Ameri-
can soldiers in World War I.18 That cross stood for seventy years
before anyone objected. On appeal the Court never ruled on the consti-
tutionality of the cross but disposed of the case on procedural
grounds.19
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision
In a 7–2 decision, with five concurrences and an opinion written by
Justice Alito, the United States Supreme Court in American Legion
overturned the Fourth Circuit’s holding. The Court held the Cross did
not violate the Establishment Clause, relying on the historical tradi-
tions test utilized in Marsh v. Chambers,20 Van Orden v. Perry,21 and
Town of Greece v. Galloway.22 As a prelude to its decision, the Court
made several findings. It found that, although the general symbol of a
Latin cross is unquestionably a religious symbol, it had “also taken on
a secular meaning.”23 The Court also found that, given the historical
circumstances surrounding World War I, the figure of a cross was a
logical symbol to memorialize the veterans killed in that war.24
No conclusive evidence suggested that religious motivations were
the only—or even the primary—reason for initially deciding on the
symbol of a cross to be used in the memorial. As the Court stated,
while “we do not know precisely why the [designers of the memorial]
chose the cross, it is unsurprising that the committee—and many
others commemorating World War I—adopted a symbol so widely as-
sociated with that wrenching event.”25 Not only was the Court unable
to ascertain the original purposes of the Cross—religious or secular—
but it found that over time, the purposes of the Cross multiplied and
changed.26 Furthermore, according to the Court, just as the purposes
17. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
18. Id. at 705–06.
19. Id. at 726, 722.
20. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
21. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
22. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
23. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019). As the Court
recognized, “there are instances in which [the cross’s] message is now almost en-
tirely secular.” Id. (citing the cross symbol used by the Red Cross and in the
Swiss flag, as well as by corporations such as Blue Cross Blue Shield).
24. Id. at 2074–76, 2090.
25. Id. at 2076.
26. Id. at 2082–83.
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behind the Cross evolved over time, so too did the messages conveyed
by that monument.27
A primary focus of the Court’s opinion in American Legion was its
disposal of the Lemon test as the appropriate test for the dispute at
hand.28 Recognizing the “shortcomings” of the Lemon test, the oldest
of the Establishment Clause tests, the Court noted that in previous
cases it had either declined to apply the test or it had simply ignored
the test.29 In American Legion, the Court explained why Lemon
“presents particularly daunting problems” and should not be ap-
plied.30 These problems, as the Court dissected them, related to the
specific facts at hand, involving a passive display built nearly ninety
years earlier to memorialize soldiers killed in war.31 Acknowledging
the hostility to religion and doctrinal chaos fostered by Lemon,32 as
well as the failure of Lemon to fulfill its ambitious attempt to “find a
grand unified theory of the Establishment Clause,” the Court in Amer-
ican Legion decided on a much narrower and more modest approach of
the historical traditions test.33 It was as if the failure of Lemon’s
grand test discouraged the Court from any broader or more compre-
hensive view of the Establishment Clause. However, as much as the
Court may have dismissed Lemon, it did so narrowly, refusing to apply
it only to longstanding passive displays such as the Cross.34
In place of the Lemon test used by the Fourth Circuit to find the
Cross unconstitutional, the Court resorted to the historical traditions
test. As narrowly applied in American Legion, the historical traditions
27. Id. at 2085.
28. The three-part Lemon test was first articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971) and was used by the Fourth Circuit to rule that the Cross violated the
Establishment Clause. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Plan-
ning Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195, 206–10 (4th Cir. 2017).
29. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080.
30. Id. at 2081.
31. Id. at 2082.
32. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 118–20 (1992) (outlining the doctrinal chaos fostered by Lemon).
33. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087. As Justice Gorsuch stated, “Lemon was a misad-
venture . . . Scores of judges have pleaded with us to retire Lemon, scholars of all
stripes have criticized the doctrine, and a majority of this Court has long done the
same. Today, not a single Member of the Court even tries to defend Lemon
against these criticisms—and they don’t because they can’t.” Id. at 2101 (Gor-
such, J., concurring in judgment) (citation omitted).
34. “Today, the Court declines to apply Lemon in a case in the religious symbols and
religious speech category . . . The Court’s decision in this case again makes clear
that the Lemon test does not apply to Establishment Clause cases in that cate-
gory.” Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). The narrowness of the decision
was reflected in Justice Kagan’s concurrence: “Although I agree that rigid appli-
cation of the Lemon test does not solve every Establishment Clause problem . . . I
prefer at least for now to [proceed on a] case-by-case [basis], rather than to sign
on to any broader statements about history’s role in Establishment Clause analy-
sis.” Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring in part).
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test holds that sufficiently longstanding passive religious symbols
that have over time taken on one or more secular meanings do not
violate the Establishment Clause. Articulated in Marsh v. Chambers,
which upheld the practice of a chaplain leading a prayer at the begin-
ning of a state legislative session, the historical traditions test looks to
whether the particular government–religion interaction had a suffi-
ciently long historical record.35 The Court’s long analysis of why
Lemon did not apply supported the Court’s use of the historical tradi-
tions test to uphold the Cross.36 For instance, the Court noted that the
Cross had stood for so long that it had acquired various secular mean-
ings; it had stood so long that viewers had acquired secular images
and perceptions of the Cross.37 Moreover, there was no evidence that
the government was using the Cross for religious purposes or func-
tions, nor that it was discriminating against other religions by not dis-
mantling the Cross.
The problem with the historical traditions test insofar as its ability
to resolve other Establishment Clause issues is that it looks only to
the distant past. Consequently, a host of unanswered questions per-
sist in the aftermath of American Legion. As the Court stated, “the
passage of time gives rise to a strong presumption of constitutional-
ity.”38 The Cross had stood for eighty-nine years. But how long must a
government-religion interaction persist before it acquires a presump-
tion of constitutionality?39 What if other longstanding religious sym-
bols or expressions do not acquire the various secular meanings or
perceptions that the Cross acquired over its eighty-nine years? What if
evidence exists that the longstanding symbol had more religious rea-
sons attached to its construction than did the Cross?
III. PASSIVE DISPLAYS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The display at issue in American Legion was built in 1925 by pri-
vate citizens on property acquired by the government in 1961.40 The
government acquired the property because of its location at a busy
intersection of highways and the public need for traffic safety and con-
35. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–88 (1983). The test was later applied in
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
36. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080–85.
37. Id. at 2082.
38. Id. at 2085.
39. As Justice Gorsuch inquired in his concurrence, “How old must a monument,
symbol, or practice be to qualify for this new presumption?” Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in judgment).
40. Id. at 2074, 2078.
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trol.41 An Establishment Clause challenge to the display came in
2014.42
According to the monument’s objectors in American Legion, the
only way the government could have avoided an Establishment
Clause violation was to dismantle or disfigure the monument as soon
as it received an objection to the display.43 However, such a dramatic
destruction of a Latin cross would most likely have caused great of-
fense and outrage, which is the result the endorsement test seeks to
prevent, albeit for a different group of people.44
The endorsement test has been a primary test for evaluating Es-
tablishment Clause challenges to religious expression or displays of
religious symbols.45 As applied, the endorsement test has focused on
aiding dissenting individuals who feel alienated by expressions of per-
ceived linkages of church and state.46
While the Court did not specifically mention the endorsement test
in American Legion, it did implicitly refer to it through its discussion
of Lemon.47 Since the endorsement test is an offshoot of Lemon, much
of the Court’s analysis of Lemon also applies to the Court’s decision
not to use the endorsement test in American Legion.
Although American Legion did not use the endorsement test, the
Court also did not overrule it for any other fact setting. Because the
Court’s decision was so narrow, the endorsement test, although not
applied in American Legion, could still govern other Establishment
Clause cases involving even slightly different factual scenarios. More-
over, the endorsement test is still worthy of discussion because of its
logical relevance to issues on the flip side of the issue presented in
American Legion: the constitutionality of government dismantling of
religious symbols in particular and governmental exclusion of religion
in general. The relevance of the endorsement test arises with these
issues because of its basic concern: the alienation or marginalization
of groups offended by the religious (or anti-religious) actions of the
government.
41. Id. at 2078.
42. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 147 F. Supp. 3d 373, 380 (D. Md.
2015), rev’d sub nom. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning
Comm’n, 874 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Am. Legion
v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
43. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2078.
44. See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 30–33.
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A. Problems with the Endorsement Test
The Court introduced the endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly.48
It has since become the Court’s preeminent means for analyzing the
constitutionality of religious symbols and expression on public prop-
erty.49 Under the test, the government unconstitutionally endorses re-
ligion whenever it conveys the message that the state favors a religion
or particular religious belief.50 Thus, individual feelings of offense or
alienation become a constitutional trump card against any religious
expression or symbol on public property. This was precisely the issue
that arose in American Legion, where the few named plaintiffs filed a
complaint based on their feelings of offense and alienation as they
drove the busy highways surrounding the display.51
Aside from its subjectivity, another problem with the endorsement
test is that it involves underlying assumptions that no longer comport
with social reality. In the current state of contemporary society, secu-
larists are not the small minority and Christian activists are not the
dominant majority.52 Therefore, any perceived linkages between state
and church can most likely be addressed through democratic action.
In the true spirit of the endorsement test, which strives to remedy
social alienation due to religious actions by the government, religious
believers have now become the alienated. If, as the endorsement test
declares, the Establishment Clause focuses on alienated religious mi-
norities, then perhaps in contemporary society it is the religious be-
liever who should be the beneficiary of the Clause—because for the
government to dismantle a longstanding religious symbol built by pri-
vate parties is to alienate followers of that religion and show hostility
to that religion.
In its application, the endorsement test inherently sides with the
dissenters, as demonstrated in Buono v. Norton, where the Court or-
dered that a cross be removed from a federal preserve.53 The cross was
48. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
49. See Alberto B. Lopez, Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette’s Imbalance of
Free Speech and Establishment, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 167, 195 (2003). Since County
of Allegheny, which confirmed the endorsement test as the Court’s preferred
method of analysis, the Court has continued its reliance on the endorsement test
for Establishment Clause cases. Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593
(1989). The Court recently applied the test in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000).
50. Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593. The banning of the crèche, in Kennedy’s opin-
ion reflected “an unjustified hostility toward religion” and a “callous indifference
toward religious faith that our cases and traditions do not require.” Id. at 655,
664.
51. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019).
52. See infra note 76.
53. Buono v. Norton, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (C.D. Cal., 2002). For the U.S. Supreme
Court decision, which ruled on procedural grounds rather than First Amendment
grounds, see Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
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a memorial to veterans who died in World War I.54 The Veterans of
Foreign Wars erected it in 1934, sixty years before the land on which
the cross stood was made part of the federal preserve.55 Approxi-
mately 130,000 acres comprised the preserve, and the less-than-eight-
foot-tall cross stood on undeveloped land, well off of one of the narrow
secondary roads winding through the preserve.56 Almost all the view-
ers of this cross were automobile travelers who had made a conscious
decision to drive through that particular secondary road.57 But con-
trary to free speech cases, the Court did not require offended viewers
to take any steps to avoid the harm, such as taking another road or
not looking up at the cross as they passed by. The Court also seemed
indifferent to the context of the cross, concluding that the size of the
cross and the number of people who view it are not important for de-
ciding whether a reasonable observer would perceive the cross as a
governmental endorsement of religion.58 In making this ruling, the
Court disregarded the plaque displayed at the base of the cross which
specified the purpose for which the cross had been erected.
B. The Endorsement Test as a Secular Trump Card
The endorsement test rests in part on Justice O’Connor’s premise
that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from sending
messages that divide the community into outsiders and insiders.59 In
Lynch, Justice O’Connor wrote, “endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.”60 Such a read-
ing also gives a “heckler’s veto” to anyone who objects to religious
speech or symbolism in the public square—a censoring power that the
Free Speech Clause otherwise prohibits.61 As Richard Duncan ob-
serves, the “endorsement test has been used by the Court as a vehicle
54. Buono, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. (“The cross is mounted on the top of a prominent rock outcropping on the
north side of Cima Road, a narrow blacktop secondary road that passes through
the Preserve.”).
58. Id. at 1216.
59. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that government
actions endorsing religion “make religion relevant, in reality or public perception,
to status in the political community”).
60. Id. at 688. To Justice O’Connor, the endorsement test functioned to prevent gov-
ernment from “making a citizen’s religious affiliation a criterion for full member-
ship in the political community.” Id. at 690.
61. See Richard Duncan, Just Another Brick in the Wall: The Establishment Clause
as a Heckler’s Veto, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 255, 264–65 (2014) (stating “the evil in
heckler’s veto situations is that it empowers hecklers to silence any speaker of
whom they do not approve”).
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for allowing offended observers . . . to impose heckler’s vetoes on
harmless religious expression in the public culture.”62 But if the en-
dorsement test gives a heckler’s veto to the maintenance of a long-
standing display, should it not also give such a veto to the forced
removal of that display?
Indeed, the Court in American Legion recognized the kind of of-
fense that religious believers would feel at the forced removal of a
longstanding religious monument.63 As Justice Alito wrote, “when
time’s passage imbues a religiously expressive monument, symbol, or
practice with this kind of familiarity and historical significance, re-
moving it may no longer appear neutral, especially to the local com-
munity for which it has taken on particular meaning.”64 Elsewhere in
the opinion, Justice Alito acknowledged that as religious symbols or
monuments become a familiar part of the landscape, “requiring their
removal would not be viewed by many as a neutral act.”65 Thus, if the
concerns of the endorsement test are to be equally applied, those who
feel alienated or offended by forced removal of religious symbols
should have grounds to assert an Establishment Clause violation.
IV. THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Institutional Nonpreferentialism
The Establishment Clause keeps government from discriminating
against the existence—not just the exercise—of religion. And the exis-
tence means a non-governmentally determined social sphere free of
government doctrinal interference or favoritism. The Clause protects
the opportunity for a vibrantly pluralistic religious presence in
society.
According to historian Thomas Curry, the classical concept of an
exclusive state church dominated the American image of an establish-
ment of religion throughout the colonial and constitutional periods.66
A state preference of one religious denomination over others was what
was primarily thought to be an establishment of religion, as the Fram-
ers did not want to duplicate the English experience with the estab-
lished Anglican church.67 In the American view, the most repressive
62. Id. at 277.
63. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2084–85 (2019).
64. Id. (adding that a “government that roams the land, tearing down monuments
with religious symbolism and scrubbing away any reference to the divine will
strike many as aggressively hostile to religion”).
65. Id. at 2086.
66. THOMAS J. CURRY, The First Freedoms 146, 192 (1986).
67. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (stating “for the men who wrote
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the ‘establishment’ of a religion
connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity”). Separation of church and state was a concept focused on
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aspect of establishment involved government intrusion into religious
doctrines and liturgies.68
The Establishment Clause should require courts to focus on what
government is doing to become a religious actor or influence other re-
ligious actors. The Clause does not focus on what perceptions individ-
uals might have. An establishment of religion occurs only when the
government has involved itself in a permanent or ongoing way in the
institutional integrity of an existing or created religious
denomination.69
B. Protecting the Existence of Religion
Just as government cannot set up its own religion, government
should not be able to exclude or marginalize religion in the public
square. Although the Supreme Court has never specifically ruled that
disapproval or exclusion of religion violates the Establishment Clause,
some cases suggest that such a ruling might be appropriate.70 One
commentator notes that many observers “regard the exclusion of relig-
ious perspectives from schools and public services to evince a hostility
toward religion and to be tantamount to an establishment of secular-
ism,” thus making religious followers “feel like political outsiders.”71
ensuring the institutional independence and integrity of religious groups,
preventing government from dictating articles of faith or interfering in the inter-
nal operations of religious bodies. As Elisha Williams wrote, every church should
have the “[r]ight to judge in what [m]anner God is to be worshiped by them, and
what [f]orm of [d]iscipline ought to be observed by them, and the [r]ight also of
electing their own [o]fficers” free of interference from government officials. ELI-
SHA WILLIAMS, THE ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF PROTESTANTS, 46 (Bos-
ton, S. Kneeland & T. Green, 1744) (emphasis omitted).
68. JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL EXPERIMENT 51 (4th ed. 2016). The English ecclesiastical law, for instance,
had formally required use of the King James version of the Bible and of the litur-
gies and prayers of the Book of Common Prayer. It had also demanded adherence
to the Thirty-Nine Articles of Faith. Akhil Reed Amar argues that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibited the federal government from having any power to act in
this area. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 246 (1998). As Amar explains,
the possibility of national control over such a powerful social institution as relig-
ion, which shaped the behavior and cultivated the habits of the citizenry, struck
fear in the hearts of Anti-Federalists. Id. at 45.
69. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint
on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1988).
70. See Jay Wexler, Government Disapproval of Religion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 119,
121–22 (2013).
71. Richard Esenberg, You Cannot Lose If You Choose Not to Play: Toward a More
Modest Establishment Clause, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 50 (2006) (also
stating that “several lower courts, faced with an argument that the exclusion of
expressions of faith from public life constitutes an establishment of secularism,
have also emphasized the need for some active advocacy, as opposed to the mere
assumption, of irreligion”). “The problem is that government has systematically,
whether by constitutional fiat, fear of litigation, or a secularist bent, ruled out
2020] AMERICAN LEGION 655
Under the endorsement test, state disapproval of religion, just as
state endorsement of a religion, should be unconstitutional.72 The re-
moval of a longstanding religious symbol may well be viewed as gov-
ernment’s attack on the presence of religion in the life of the
community. Indeed, if the endorsement test is really about ensuring
that no member of the community feel like a second-class citizen be-
cause of his or her religious beliefs, then it should apply to both relig-
ious believers and nonbelievers. It should not have a one-sided
application to only nonbelievers. As Noah Feldman notes,
“[i]ncreasingly, the symbolism of removing religion from the schools,
courthouses, or the public square is experienced by values evangeli-
cals as excluding them, no matter how much the legal secularists tell
them that is not the intent.”73 Feldman further observes that the “con-
stitutional decisions marginalizing or banning religion from public
places have managed to alienate millions of people who are also sin-
cerely committed to an inclusive American project.”74 Given the non-
preferentialism commands of the Establishment Clause, government
cannot exclude or discriminate against religion under the guise of pro-
moting secularism. The Establishment Clause should prohibit such
institutional or structural discrimination. Consequently, longstanding
privately-built religious symbols cannot be dismantled as a means of
protecting secular society from religion.
In his American Legion concurrence, Justice Kavanaugh suggested
that while the Court’s ruling “allows the State to maintain the cross
on public land . . . [the ruling] does not require the State to maintain
the cross on public land.”75 However, this suggestion may not be en-
tirely accurate. Clearly the government has control over how it main-
tains its property and to what uses it devotes public funds, but that
discretion might be limited in certain circumstances. Take, for in-
stance, the hypothetical of a religious house of worship located on a
busy street or highway. Outside that house, and close to the street or
highway, is located a large religious symbol that all travelers can see.
Some of those travelers, offended by the symbol, complain to their lo-
cal government. In response, the local government decides to take
through eminent domain a slice of property abutting the highway for
use as a planned public walkway. This slice is wide enough to include
the symbol. Consequently, the government obtains the property, de-
molishes the symbol, and then either constructs or does not construct
religion as an approach to whatever information is being imparted or service be-
ing provided, effectively denying its relevance.” Id. at 52.
72. See Mark Strasser, The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
1273, 1276–77 (2013).
73. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 15 (2005).
74. Id.
75. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2094 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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the walkway. Once the government has obtained the once-private land
upon which a religious symbol stands, the Establishment Clause may
impose duties requiring symbol maintenance not foreseen by Justice
Kavanaugh.
V. RELIGION IN MODERN SECULAR SOCIETY
The danger addressed by the Establishment Clause is that, in a
democracy, the majority would use the force of government to estab-
lish a state-funded, state-mandated religion. In this way, the majority
would use its political power to dictate religious truth and observance.
When the cross at issue in American Legion was constructed,
Christianity was a dominant social and political force in America. A
person’s social standing depended at least in part on their member-
ship in a Christian sect or their adherence to Christian doctrine. Some
ninety years later, when the existence of that cross was being liti-
gated, America was a greatly changed nation and society. Membership
in Christian sects continues to decline, while the number of people
having no religious affiliation continues to rise.76 In the 1950s, three
76. While the percentage of adults who describe themselves as religiously affiliated
has shrunk, the percentage of those who are religiously unaffiliated has jumped.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. PUBLIC BECOMING LESS RELIGIOUS (2015). White
Christians now account for less than half of the public, and America’s youngest
religious groups are all non-Christian. ROBERT P. JONES & DANIEL COX, PUBLIC
RELIGION RESEARCH INSTITUTE, AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 7 (2017)
(stating that no religious group is larger than those who are unaffiliated from
religion, which make up 24% of the public, and that young adults are more than
three times as likely as seniors to identify as religiously unaffiliated). A recent
survey shows that people having no religious affiliation are tied with Catholic
and evangelicals as the three largest religious (or nonreligious) groups in the
United States. Jack Jenkins, ‘Nones’ Now as Big as Evangelicals, Catholics in the
U.S., RELIGION NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 21, 2019), https://religionnews.com/2019/
03/21/nones-now-as-big-as-evangelicals-catholics-in-the-us/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/E8VL-5UZK]. Other studies show that Christian membership continues to
decline in the U.S., while those having no religion continues to increase. Allison
De Jong, Protestants Decline, More Have No Religion in a Sharply Shifting Relig-
ious Landscape, ABC NEWS (May 10, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/prot
estants/decline/religion-sharply-shifting-religious-landscape-poll/story?id=54995
663 [https://perma.unl.edu/37XF-8LWT]. In a recent poll, twenty-nine percent of
Americans were found to be nonreligious, with another thirty-two percent only
somewhat religious, thus constituting a clear majority of the public. PEW RE-
SEARCH CENTER, THE RELIGIOUS TYPOLOGY: A NEW WAY TO CATEGORIZE AMERI-
CANS BY RELIGION 5 (2019). A 2019 Wall Street Journal poll found that just
twenty-nine percent of Americans attend religious services once a week, down
from forty-one percent in 2000. Gerald Seib, Cradles, Pews, and the Societal
Shifts Coming to Politics, Wall St. J., June 25, 2019, at A4. According to the same
poll, the numbers of those aged 18 to 34 who never attend religious services has
more than doubled since 2000, now thirty-six percent. Id. For a discussion on how
the nonreligious are becoming more secular, see Michael Lipka, Religious ‘Nones’
Are Not Only Growing, They’re Becoming More Secular, FACTTANK: NEWS IN THE
NUMBERS (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/11/reli
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percent of Americans had no religious affiliation, which has grown to
nearly eight times that figure in recent years.77 Moreover, both legally
and politically, Christian believers and practitioners often find them-
selves the object of attack and scorn.78 As constitutional law scholar
Gerard Bradley writes, “For the first time in American history, it has
become respectable to publicly oppose religious liberty and its su-
preme value in our polity.”79
The decline in the percentage of the population that is religiously
affiliated translates into a similar decline in the social and cultural
sensitivity toward religious beliefs. While the general society might
once have possessed an instinctive respect for, or at least understand-
ing of, strongly held religious beliefs, if for no other reason than a vast
majority of Americans had some affiliation with organized religion,
such may not be the case now, especially with large numbers of Ameri-
cans having no experience with organized religion.80
For example, in Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Comm’n, the Court found the Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion had shown religious animosity in its rulings that Jack Phillips, a
Christian baker, violated state civil rights laws by refusing a make a
cake for a gay couple’s wedding.81 In part through the “inappropriate
gious-nones-are-not-only-growing-theyre-becoming-more-secular/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/9JKH-DTCU]. This “generational replacement” effect means that as
“older Americans with relatively strong religious commitments die off, younger
less affiliated Americans gradually will take their place . . . [and the] Nones will
make up an increasingly large percentage of the population.” See Mark L. Movse-
sian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 42 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 711, 723 (2019).
77. Id. at 722–23.
78. See infra notes 85–94. Reflecting the shifting social attitudes against religion, the
Democratic National Committee on August 24, 2019 passed a resolution specifi-
cally praising the religiously unaffiliated, stating that “religiously unaffiliated
Americans overwhelmingly share the Democratic Party’s values” and that the
deeply religious have used their beliefs, “with misplaced claims of religious lib-
erty,” to oppress other groups. Peter Hasson, DNC Resolution Celebrates Relig-
iously Unaffiliated, THE DAILY SIGNAL (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.dailysignal
.com/2019/08/30/dnc-resolution-celebrates-religiously-unaffiliated/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/8EAN-67DC].
79. Gerard V. Bradley, Sexual Identity Politics and Religious Freedom in a Secular
Age, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.thePublicDiscourse.com/
2019/04/50836/ [https://perma.unl.edu/H3J2-UQ7Y]. See also Patrick M. Garry,
The Cultural Hostility to Religion, 47 MOD. AGE 121 (2005) (discussing a pattern
of judicial, institutional and cultural hostility toward religion in modern Ameri-
can society).
80. See Movsesian, supra note 76 at 729.
81. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1729–31 (2018). For a scholarly discussion that the Commission was tainted by
prejudice against Christians, see Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg, Masterpiece
Cakeshop: Not as Narrow as May First Appear, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2018,
3:48 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/Symposium-Masterpiece-Cake
shop-Not-as-Narrow-as-May-First-Appear/ [https://perma.unl.edu/X3M4-VH2E].
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and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for Phil-
lips’ free exercise rights,” the Commission showed “a clear and imper-
missible hostility toward [Phillips’] sincere religious beliefs.”82 The
Court cited the statements of one commissioner, who “went so far as to
compare Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to
defenses of slavery and the Holocaust.”83 Another statement referred
to the “despicable” nature of Phillips’s religious beliefs regarding
same-sex weddings.84
To the Court, the Commission had been blatantly biased against
Phillips’s religious liberty claims.85 Moreover, throughout the agency
and appellate process, neither the agency nor courts considered Phil-
lips’s religious claims to be worthy of judicial consideration; the only
question addressed by the Colorado courts was whether the secular
antidiscrimination norms were violated.86 As Steven Smith points
out, because Phillips’s actions caused no measurable damages to the
same-sex complainants, the prosecution against Phillips was really
about punishing his religious beliefs.87
In a case involving Oregon bakers who were fined for refusing to
bake a cake for a same-sex wedding, the Commissioner of the Oregon
Bureau of Labor and Industries, as part of his 2015 ruling imposing a
fine, also ordered the former owners of Sweet Cakes by Melissa to
“cease and desist” from communicating about any future intent to ex-
ercise their religious beliefs in ways that might discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation.88
Similarly, a Catholic order of nuns whose mission involves caring
for the elderly poor, had to sue the government because the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) put them in an unresolvable position: either sacrifice
their religious beliefs or give up their religious mission.89 The Little
Sisters of the Poor took their opposition to the Act’s mandate that they
offer contraceptive and abortion-inducing drugs in their healthcare
plans for their employees all the way to the Supreme Court.90 This
82. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
83. Id. at 1729–30.
84. Movsesian, supra note 76, at 720.
85. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
86. Id.
87. Steven D. Smith, What Masterpiece Cakeshop is Really About, PUBLIC DISCOURSE
(Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/10/20148/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/6LQ9-ZEZK]. As a further show of bias, the Commission had refused on
numerous occasions to take any action against bakers who, because of conscience,
refused to make cakes with anti-gay marriage messages, thus demonstrating
that it was not being fair or neutral to Phillips’s conscientious actions. Master-
piece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31.
88. Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1086–87 (Or. Ct. App.
2017), vacated 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019).
89. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
90. Id.
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was not a case of the federal government wanting those employees to
have access to contraception, but instead the federal government try-
ing to force the Little Sisters of the Poor to violate their own religious
beliefs and distribute those contraceptives through their own health
plan.
Aside from the fact that the federal government seemed intent on
forcing the Little Sisters of the Poor to either violate their Catholic
beliefs or give up their social mission, Congress did not actually enact
the contraceptive mandate.91 It was the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) that defined the “preventative care” language
in the Act to cover contraceptives.92 Not only did HHS know that its
ruling would force religious believers like Little Sisters of the Poor to
violate their religious beliefs, but it also knew that the regulations
would burden religious free exercise more generally.93 Because the
contraceptive mandate was not in the statute, the government was
under no legal obligation to include contraceptive coverage under the
ACA’s mandates, and the federal government knew how the mandate
conflicted with religious beliefs, it is obvious that the federal govern-
ment deliberately provoked the fight that took the Little Sisters of the
Poor to court.94
The federal government’s animosity to religion was also evident in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, where the
government’s attempt to regulate the ministerial officials of a relig-
ious organization was struck down by a rare unanimous ruling by the
Supreme Court.95 California Senator Dianne Feinstein displayed a
similar animus when she suggested at the judicial nomination hearing
of Amy Coney Barrett that Professor Barrett’s deeply held Catholic
beliefs were problematic and might be disqualifying.96
Religious hospitals, social service providers and universities have
been besieged by a regulatory environment that can be overtly hostile
91. The ACA required all health plans to include coverage for certain preventive care
services for women. See Pub. L. 111-148 Sec. 2713, 124 Stat. 131 (Mar. 23, 2010).
However, the Act never defined contraceptive products or services within the def-
inition of “preventive care services.” The so-called contraceptive mandate was
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, as part of the
regulations promulgated to implement the ACA.
92. Id.
93. Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, Obamacare Again? A Second Chance for the Little
Sisters, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar. 28, 2016, at 20–21.
94. See supra note 91.
95. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportu-
nity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (holding that the internal governance of a
religious institution is absolutely protected by the First Amendment).
96. See Aaron Blake, Did Dianne Feinstein Accuse a Judicial Nominee of Being Too
Christian? WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
the-fix/wp/2017/09/07/did-a-democratic-senator-just-accuse-a-judicial-nominee-
of-being-too-christian/ [https://perma.unl.edu/YC3J-WWUU].
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to religious doctrine regarding such issues as abortion, same-sex mar-
riage, and transgender surgeries.97 For instance, Catholic social ser-
vice agencies, long admired for their efficient and compassionate care,
have now found themselves in the cross hairs of a government hostil-
ity.98 This marks a dramatic turnaround from nearly two decades ear-
lier, when religious social service groups experienced a much more
supportive environment under President Bush’s Faith-Based
Initiatives.99
Pursuant to a growing political trend, administrative agencies at
both the federal and state levels are committed to enforcing an equal-
ity based on secular norms, and in turn, see religious norms as hostile
to this new perception of equality.100 In the guise of promoting equal-
ity, albeit an equality inherently biased against religion, the adminis-
trative state has turned its sights on breaking down “the social
boundaries” that religious believers erect “to maintain their distinc-
tiveness and preserve their values.”101
VI. THE WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE APPROACHES
American Legion only addressed longstanding passive displays.
The Court said nothing about what other Establishment Clause ap-
proaches would or could be used in other fact settings. Neutrality is
one such approach the Court did not discuss.
A. The Rise of the Neutrality Approach
Given social and cultural changes—particularly the growing ani-
mosity toward religion—the shortcomings of current Establishment
Clause doctrines have become especially evident. In particular, the
neutrality approach, while seemingly fair on its face to religion, has
revealed its inherent biases.
97. Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Po-
litical-Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 66 (2017).
98. Id. at 75–76.
99. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitu-
tion, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 5–15 (2005).
100. See Movsesian, supra note 76, at 714 (arguing this governmental activism seri-
ously infringes on the beliefs and practices of the traditionally religious
population).
101. Id. at 740–41 (arguing “The Traditionally Religious face an expanding set of rules
and policies that promote new understandings of equality, particularly with re-
spect to sexuality and gender, along with an every-expanding bureaucracy dedi-
cated to enforcing them. . . . The Traditionally Religious face increasing pressure
to accept the new understandings and comply with the new rules, or face a ‘loom-
ing threat of a wide range of legal sanctions.’”).
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Neutrality is based upon the principle of equal treatment for relig-
ion and non-religion.102 In Good News Club v. Milford Central
School,103 for instance, a commitment to viewpoint neutrality led the
Court to overturn a school board policy excluding religious groups
from after-hours use of school facilities. The Good News opinion, along
with earlier decisions in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District104 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Uni-
versity of Virginia,105 stand for the proposition that the Establishment
Clause cannot be used to justify viewpoint discrimination against re-
ligious organizations seeking the same kinds of public benefits that
secular groups receive.106
In a more direct application of the Establishment Clause, the
Court in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District107 upheld a pro-
vision allowing a publicly funded sign language interpreter to be pro-
vided for a deaf student at a religious school, reasoning that
government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class
of citizens defined without reference to religion do not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.108 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,109 the Court
used the neutrality doctrine to uphold Cleveland’s school voucher pro-
gram. It ruled the vouchers promoted private choice by giving money
directly to students for their use at either religious or non-religious
schools.110 This scheme was found neutral because it left the decision
of whether to apply funds toward a religious education to private
choice and not government action (i.e., individuals, and not govern-
ment, decide through enrollment decisions whether funds would go to
102. See Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2000).
103. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
104. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
105. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
106. Likewise, a neutrality approach has also been used to strike down the no-aid
approach, which prohibited the flow of any governmental benefit to any religious
organization, since a strict no-aid reading of the Establishment Clause would re-
quire the exclusion of religious institutions from generally available government
aid programs, and would thus constitute a penalty on the free exercise of religion.
See Thomas R. McCoy, Quo Vadis: Is the Establishment Clause Undergoing Meta-
morphosis?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 547, 549 (2003) (stating that the no-aid approach
contributed to the perceived irreconcilable tension between the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses).
107. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
108. Id. at 8.
109. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
110. Id. at 662–63. In Zelman, the Court’s finding that the Ohio program was one of
true private choice was based upon the determination that the program is neutral
toward religion, gives aid directly to a broad class of citizens without considera-
tion of religion, and permits public and both religious and secular private schools
to participate. See id. at 648–54.
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religious schools).111 The Zelman decision capped a trend of case law
upholding government aid programs available to students of both pub-
lic and private schools,112 but rejecting programs that favor students
attending non-public schools over students attending public schools as
an impermissible establishment of religion.113
Compared with previous case law, neutrality initially appeared to
be an advantageous doctrine for religion. Illustrative of previous judi-
cial hostility to religion is Aguilar v. Felton,114 where the Court ruled
against parochial school participation in a special education program
in the New York City school system. The program, first enacted in
1965 as a cornerstone of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, provided re-
medial English and mathematics assistance to economically and edu-
cationally disadvantaged students.115 By statute, school districts were
required to provide comparable services to both public and private
school students.116 In the nineteen year history of the program, not a
single instance of unconstitutional involvement by agents of one
school system in the other was documented.117 Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court still invalidated the program on grounds of excessive en-
tanglement,118 implying that the proponents of the program, not its
opponents, had the burden of proving that there would never be a
problem in the administration of the program.119
Even though neutrality is a better approach for religion than that
used in Aguilar, it still has drawbacks. Based on the principle that
government must be neutral between religion and non-religion, neu-
trality prohibits government from providing any benefits to religion
unless they are made equally available to nonreligious groups or indi-
111. Id. at 622–23.
112. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983) (approving of an aid program
benefitting public and private school students).
113. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782–83,
794 (1973).
114. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997).
115. Id. at 406.
116. Chapter 1 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 463.
117. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 424 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 414.
119. The Supreme Court abandoned the reasoning of Aguilar when it overruled that
decision in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). In Agostini, the Court stressed
the importance of formal neutrality in concluding that the Establishment Clause
did not preclude publicly funded teachers from teaching secular, remedial courses
on the premises of religious schools under a federally funded program that sup-
ported teaching at nonreligious schools as well. Although the Court also relied on
other considerations, it suggested that Establishment Clause invalidation would
be unlikely when aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that
neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and
secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id. at 230–32.
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viduals. Thus, neutrality prevents the state from accommodating par-
ticular religious practices or from flexibly dealing with the unique
problems and needs of religion. For instance, government cannot
grant to religious organizations exemptions from the burdens of gen-
erally applicable laws, because if the exemption at all favors religion—
even religion in general—it will probably violate the Establishment
Clause.120 As one scholar has noted, “the immediate impact of for-
mal neutrality may seem beneficial for religion, but its long-term
effect . . . may be to . . . secularize religion.”121
B. Neutrality as a Denial of Religion’s Role
Despite the fact that religious liberty is the first freedom men-
tioned in the Bill of Rights, the neutrality doctrine implies that relig-
ion is neither distinct nor distinctly important. Critics of the doctrine
argue that it is “inadequately sensitive to religious freedom by flatly
prohibiting all religious exemptions from general regulations no mat-
ter how greatly they burden religious exercise and how insubstantial
the competing state interest may be.”122 By leveling religion to the
same plane as the secular, neutrality ignores constitutional text and
history, as well as the special role and value that the framers envi-
sioned for it in American society. Moreover, contained within the neu-
trality approach is the assumption that the First Amendment protects
secularism as much as religion. Instead, the First Amendment singled
out religion for special treatment based on a whole set of historical
factors and theological beliefs prevalent in the eighteenth century.123
120. See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating Texas sales
tax exemption that was granted to religious literature but not to other literature).
121. Conkle, supra note 102, at 25.
122. JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTER-
PRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 21 (1995).
123. Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903, 903 (2014) [hereinaf-
ter The Last Chapter]. Religion, as the oldest institution in American social life,
has often provided the social capital necessary to overcome the atomizing force of
individualism. See STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION, 35–43 (1993). Communities
fostered by religion create a valuable buffer between the state and the individual.
See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). They allow and
advance the flourishing of moral principles, and they promote cultural diversity.
See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious
Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99, 116 (1989). A healthy democracy cannot sur-
vive without a social value system that supports the communal interests and
bonds of that society. Religion counteracts the destructive urges of individual
narcissism that elevate self-centeredness to the point that it drowns out any
sense of public responsibility. For an outline of the harms brought to American
culture through an elevation of individual narcissism and of an obsession with
self identity see CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM (1979). Conse-
quently, with the increasing separation of religious influences from the public
sphere over the past several decades, society has witnessed dramatically higher
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In addition to its cultural role, religion also serves a vital political
role. It is not only an important source of viewpoints in the process of
democratic self-government, but it has been a powerful political mo-
tivator behind some of the nation’s greatest crusades.124 Religious or-
ganizations, for instance, energized both the abolitionist movement of
the nineteenth century and the civil rights movement of the twentieth
century. This view of religion and its importance to public morality
and civic virtue was expressed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, who stated
that “[o]ur government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply
felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is.”125 And this opinion was
squarely within the tradition of the framers.
Religious institutions also perform vital social welfare services.126
This ability was highlighted in Zelman, the Cleveland school voucher
case. Prompting the voucher program was a recognition of the “crisis
of magnitude” that existed in the Cleveland public school system, with
only ten percent of ninth graders passing a proficiency test and more
than two-thirds of high school students failing to graduate.127 The
program passed with the strong support of inner-city minorities, as a
way of escaping the chronically failing urban schools.128 In Zelman,
Justice Thomas observed that “failing urban public schools dispropor-
tionately affect minority children most in need of educational opportu-
nity.”129 He warned that the “failure to provide education to poor
urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of poverty, dependence,
criminality, and alienation that continues for the remainder of their
lives.”130 He then cited data from Cleveland showing that religious
schools are more educationally effective than public schools.131
levels of violence, divorce, illegitimacy, and other manifestations of cultural dys-
function. DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN PRESSER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES AND PHILOSOPHY, 196 (1998). Americans often
name the loss of religion as a leading cause of difficult social problems such as
drugs and crime. Laurie Messerly, Reviving Religious Liberty in America, 8
NEXUS 151, 164 (2003).
124. Political movements owing to religious inspirations include the Social Gospel
movement, nearly all the peace movements, the demand for freer immigration of
refugees, abolition and civil rights.
125. SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE NATION WITH THE SOUL OF A CHURCH 25 (1975).
126. See JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY 80–81 (1999) (arguing that religion
is able to serve some social welfare goals or functions better than secular
institutions).
127. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002).
128. Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and its Effects
on Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1173 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Reading Zelman] (arguing that almost a half-century after Brown v. Board of
Education was handed down, most blacks are still not getting a decent education,
and so vouchers are a necessary next step beyond Brown).
129. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 681–82.
130. Id. at 683.
131. Id. at 681.
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Whereas ninety-five percent of the eighth graders in Catholic schools
passed a state reading test, only fifty-seven percent of their public
school peers did. Similarly, whereas seventy-five percent of the Catho-
lic school students passed a math proficiency test, their public school
peers had only a twenty-two percent passage rate.132 Furthermore, in
Zelman, evidence showed that the average cost of sending a child to a
religious school is considerably lower than the cost of public school.133
In the Cleveland program, for example, religious schools received a
maximum of $2,250 per student in public funding, whereas public
schools were allocated $7,746 per student.134
In addition to education, prison operation and offender rehabilita-
tion has been an area in which religious organizations have proved
especially effective. Take, for instance, the case of Prison Fellowship
Ministries (PFM), a nondenominational religious group founded in
1976 by former Nixon aide Charles Colson, who embraced evangelical
Christianity while serving time in a federal prison in Alabama for his
part in the Watergate cover-up.135 PFM volunteers and staffers oper-
ate in prisons and teach faith-based courses that show inmates how
religious conviction can help them stay off drugs, care for their chil-
dren and hold down a steady job.136 A civil liberties group, Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, filed suit to stop a PFM
operation in Iowa, but “one barrier to the lawsuit was finding a pris-
oner who wanted to complain.”137 Another problem for the suit was
that PFM “does a far better job rehabilitating prisoners than the gov-
ernment does.”138 Studies also show that PFM inmates, once released,
are half as likely to end up back in the criminal justice system as other
inmates.139
132. Id. A study conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics found that
minority students who attend Catholic schools do better than their public school
peers, and that disadvantaged minority students who attend Catholic high
schools are more likely to graduate, go on to college and earn a degree. VITERITTI,
supra note 126, at 83. Other studies have also found Catholic schools to better
serve minority populations than urban public schools. See id. at 84.
133. Reading Zelman, supra note 128, at 1163.
134. Id. at 1164.
135. In 1997, at the request of the Texas State Legislature, PFM was given control
over a wing at the state prison in Richmond. After assuming control, PFM imple-
mented a regimen of prayer meetings, classes, and rehabilitation programs.
136. Id.
137. Daniel Brook, When God Goes to Prison, 2003 LEGAL AFF. at 22, 24 (June 2003).
138. Id. at 24–25. To avoid constitutional problems, taxpayer money pays for only
those aspects of prison life that exists at state-run prisons. All the religious pro-
grams, which are completely voluntary, are paid for by private donations.
139. Id. at 27. See also VITERITTI, supra note 126, at 80–81 (arguing religion is able to
serve some social welfare functions better than secular institutions).
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C. Neutrality’s Erosion of Religious Liberty
By giving special recognition to religion, the government does not
just help a useful social institution to survive; it also recognizes one of
the most fundamental laws of sovereignty. The framers saw that relig-
ious duties are more important than secular duties.140 As the Declara-
tion of Independence stated, the duties owed to God transcend those
owed to any temporal authority.141 To the religious believer, the duty
to God is supreme, and religious claims are prior to and of greater
dignity than the claims of the state. The state cannot simply ignore
these claims without treating them as de facto false. Thus, even
though the state cannot determine the truth of religious beliefs, it
should respect them and afford them every possible benefit of the
doubt. As the philosopher Blaise Pascal once argued, the risk of not
respecting religious beliefs is a risk not worth taking.142
Neutrality not only ignores the special role of religion, but also
paves the way for a denial of religious freedom. In Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez, for instance, the Court upheld the decision of Has-
tings Law School to deny official recognition of the Christian Legal
Society, on the grounds that the group accepted as members only
those students who accepted the group’s stated principles, one of
which forbade sex outside of heterosexual marriage.143 Thus, because
the group violated the school’s “neutral” nondiscrimination policy, it
was denied the same recognition and benefits of other student groups.
But this so-called neutral denial, the first ever in the school’s history,
effectively violated the group’s rights of freedom of speech, association,
and religious exercise.144
Perhaps the embrace of neutrality reflects a larger social detach-
ment from a commitment to religious freedom. But if religious free-
dom loses its special status in constitutional law, the erosion of social
and political support for religion will surely place that freedom in fur-
ther jeopardy. Indeed, the whole point of granting special constitu-
tional protections to religion was to protect it even when the political
and cultural forces might turn against it.
Professor Movsesian describes this neutrality as an “equality of
sameness that treats social distinctions, especially religious distinc-
140. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154–66 (1991).
141. The primacy of conscience is reflected throughout the constitutional documents.
See Michael W. McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the First Freedom?, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1243, 1251 (2000).
142. See generally BLAISE PASCAL, PASCAL’S PENSÉES, Section 3 (John Cruickshank
trans., Grant & Cutter ed. 1983).
143. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 558 U.S. 1076 (2009).
144. The Last Chapter, supra note 123.
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tions, as arbitrary and unimportant.”145 Under this view, equality be-
comes intolerant, reflecting “a broader unwillingness to accept any
distinctions among groups and individuals.”146
D. The Wrong Baseline
By its very nature, the notion of neutrality is comparative. Neu-
trality denotes comparison. To determine whether a law or policy is
neutral, one must have some basis for comparison. One must have a
baseline against which to make comparisons. As so often applied, neu-
trality in the areas of law and religion uses a secular baseline. Be-
cause the First Amendment was ratified in an era of religious society,
the baseline was religion and the religious nature of society. But as
society has become more secular, the baseline used by courts has like-
wise shifted. Now, the secular represents the neutral comparison
point. Religion, on the other hand, is something different, something
out of the ordinary, something that threatens the neutrality of
society.147
The neutrality approach has succeeded in portraying governmen-
tal secularity as being neutral to religion.148 However, a secular “neu-
trality” that effectively pushes religion out of the public square and
denies that it is different from any other set of opinions or practices is
hardly “neutral” to religion. Instead, it is pro-secular, and if one de-
cides that secularity equals neutrality, then one can conclude that dis-
mantling long-standing religious symbols is simply a neutral action.
If secularism is the baseline of neutrality, then neutrality is essen-
tially secularism, or a policy designed to achieve and maintain secu-
larism. But secularism, vis-a-vis religion, is not neutrality. This can be
seen in the use of the endorsement test that grants a heckler’s veto to
those who object to religious expression in the public square. The en-
dorsement test is said to be neutral, because it uses secularism as its
baseline, but in its application it is not neutral to religion. In fact,
because of the endorsement test, religious expression is treated more
harshly than any other kind of speech, since religious expression on
public property, under the endorsement test, is effectively subject to a
heckler’s veto.149
145. Movsesian, supra note 76, at 714.
146. Id. at 731 (stating that under this view “equality means a rejection of the idea of
difference per se”).
147. See, e.g., James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion, and the Common Good, 39 PEPP.
L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2013) (stating that the secular represents value-neutrality,
objectivity, or “at least an inclusive realm of autonomous rationality as the basis
of a truly universal ethics”).
148. Steven D. Smith, The Plight of the Secular Paradigm, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1409, 1443 (2013).
149. See supra note 61.
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If the courts take a neutrality approach, then anything religious
cannot survive because neutrality has been equated with secularism.
Using secularism as the neutrality baseline in Establishment Clause
cases has effectively raised secularism to a constitutional command.
As Steven Smith writes, the “constitutionalization of the neutrality-
as-secularism position meant that in the future, the secularist concep-
tion would dominate not only school prayer cases, and indeed not only
Religion Clause cases, but would come to govern . . . constitutional
discourse generally.”150 Thus, not only does neutrality mean secular,
but to act in a secular manner the government must act in a way so as
to be not religious. But if this is the case, then a great deal of Ameri-
can history, throughout which government has recognized and accom-
modated religion, is undermined. Using the neutrality approach, the
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has “established political
secularism as the nation’s constitutional orthodoxy.”151
E. The Endorsement Test’s Favoring of Anti-Religion
As discussed above, another frequent approach used by the Court
to resolve Establishment Clause cases is the endorsement test. Al-
though the endorsement test does not have the built-in bias against
religion that the neutrality approach has, it has been applied in ways
that actually discriminate more against religion. The endorsement
test is not just biased against religion—it has been applied to affirma-
tively favor the anti-religious. And it has carved out a constitutional
right that gives dissenters a veto power over any religious expression
in the public square. According to the endorsement test, the secular
can never offend or alienate, but the religious frequently does.
For example, the Supreme Court has used the Establishment
Clause to strike down many local accommodations of religious exer-
cise, including all kinds of public displays of religious symbols.152 Ef-
fectively creating a “dissenter’s right” out of the Establishment
Clause, the Court has given a constitutional trump card to individuals
150. Steven D. Smith, Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the
School Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945, 992 (2011).
151. Id. at 1017.
152. According to Professor Conkle, the Supreme Court has used the Establishment
Clause “to enforce a wavering, but relatively strict, separation of church and
state at all levels of American government.” Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General
Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1117 (1988). As
Justice Kennedy stated in County of Allegheny, the Court has displayed “an un-
justified hostility toward religion” and a “callous indifference toward religious
faith.” Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655,
664 (1989). According to the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly, when courts enforce a
strict separation of church and state, they assault the freedom of religious exer-
cise as guaranteed in the First Amendment. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668
(1984).
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who claim, for instance, that their rights have been violated by a
crèche displayed on public grounds153 and by a plaque of the Ten
Commandments hanging in a courthouse.154 This dissenter’s right
has been judicially nationalized to block the religious expressions of
the larger community, regardless of the religious traditions or sensi-
bilities of the local communities in which the religious displays or ex-
pressions take place.
In County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Justice
Stevens fortified the dissenter’s right interpretation by stating that
there should be a strong presumption in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence against the display of religious symbols on public property,
since there is “always a risk that such symbols will offend nonmem-
bers of the faith being advertised as well as adherents who consider
the particular advertisement disrespectful.”155 On the other hand,
Justice Scalia took the opposite position. Focusing on the history of
the Establishment Clause and the intent of the ratifiers and framers
of that clause, Justice Scalia cited the longstanding American tradi-
tion of prayer at official ceremonies as demonstrating with unmistaka-
ble clarity that the Establishment Clause does not forbid the
government to accommodate religion,156 and does not require the sub-
version of the public expression of religious beliefs to a secularist op-
position to those beliefs.157 But according to Justice Stevens, in his
application of the endorsement test, and in a continued focus on the
perspective of the non-adherent: “A paramount purpose of the Estab-
lishment Clause is to protect such a person from being made to feel
153. Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573.
154. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
155. 492 U.S. at 650–51 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This tradition,
of course, is contradicted by Lemon’s making “advancement of religion” as a test
for an Establishment Clause violation.
157. Id. at 645–46 (Justice Scalia stating, “The issue before us today is not the ab-
stract philosophical question whether the alternative of frustrating this desire of
a religious majority is to be preferred over the alternative of imposing ‘psychologi-
cal coercion,’ or a feeling of exclusion upon nonbelievers. Rather, the question is
whether a mandatory choice in favor of the former has been imposed by the
United States Constitution. As the age-old practices of our people show, the an-
swer to that question is not at all in doubt.” (emphasis omitted)). Given his inter-
pretation of history, for instance, Justice Scalia argues that the interest in
promoting joint communal prayer among religions outweighs the interests of
nonbelievers. Id. at 646 (stating that the founders of our republic “knew that
nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among religious believers of
various faiths a toleration—no, an affection—for one another than voluntary
joining in prayer together, to the God whom they all worship and seek . . . [t]o
deprive our society of that important unifying mechanism, in order to spare the
nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal inconvenience of standing or even
sitting in respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy as it is unsup-
ported in law.”).
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like an outsider in matters of faith, and a stranger in the political com-
munity.”158 In an increasingly secular society, the endorsement test
as espoused by Justice Stevens is not really a test, but is a foregone
conclusion, because there will always be observers who will feel of-
fended or alienated by the display.
In a case that reflects a dissenter’s rights view of the Establish-
ment Clause, Skoros v. City of New York, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a New York City public school
policy on holiday season displays that forbade Christmas crèches, but
allowed the Chanukah menorah and the star and crescent of Islam.159
The government defended this policy on the ground that the Jewish
and Islamic symbols had secular meanings for most students (i.e.,
Christians, since two-thirds of the students were from Christian fami-
lies) but that the Christian nativity scene had only religious signifi-
cance.160 Thus, according to the court, the Establishment Clause
primarily extends to restrain majority religions, while serving as a
protection for minority religions that consequently possess privileges
of religious expression that the majority religions do not enjoy.
The use of a dissenter’s rights application of the Establishment
Clause also occurred in Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe.161 At issue in Santa Fe was a Texas school district’s practice of
having a student, who was annually elected to the office of student
council chaplain, deliver a prayer over the public address system
before each varsity football game.162 This practice was held by the
Court to be a violation of the Establishment Clause.163 The Court
found that the prayer practice was coercive, insofar as objecting wit-
nesses, who were in the minority, were put into the position of either
attending a personally offensive religious ritual or foregoing a tradi-
tional gathering of the school community.164
VII. CONCLUSION: WHEN THE SUPPOSED REMEDY
BECOMES THE DEPRIVATION
Religious displays or expressions on public property face a quan-
dary. There are no statutes of limitations regarding objections to those
displays. Moreover, when an objection is made, not only can no reme-
158. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799–800 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Skoros v. City of New York, 437 F.3d 1, 6–7 (2d Cir. 2006).
160. Id. at 6–8.
161. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
162. Id. at 294.
163. Id. at 320. The Court found that the practice created “the perception of encourag-
ing the delivery of prayer at a series of important school events.” Id.
164. Id. at 311.
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dial action be taken short of total removal, but even the attempt at
some remedial action can work against the display.
As Justice Souter wrote in McCreary County v. American Civil Lib-
erties Union of Kentucky, the government’s attempt to modify the Ten
Commandments display and disavow adherence to any religious be-
liefs in response to objectors was futile because the reasonable ob-
server “could not forget” the original display.165 Likewise in Buono v.
Kempthorne (Buono IV), attempts by Congress to save a war memorial
in the shape of a cross by conveying the property to private ownership
were counterproductive, according to the court, because a reasonable
observer would be aware of all the actions taken by Congress to save
the memorial and hence perceive Congress’s actions as an endorse-
ment of religion.166
As applied, the endorsement test renders any remedial efforts
nearly impossible. No matter what subsequent steps are taken to dis-
associate the governmental unit from the particular private religious
speech or symbol, the courts can always point to whatever endorse-
ment may have occurred prior to that disassociation. In Mercier v. City
of La Crosse,167 plaintiffs sued to force the removal from a public park
of a monument bearing the Ten Commandments. The monument had
been placed in the park forty years earlier by the Fraternal Order of
the Eagles.168 In an attempt to avoid the lawsuit, the city sold back to
the Eagles the twenty-foot by twenty-foot plot of land on which the
monument stood.169 Subsequently, the Eagles installed a tall iron
fence around the perimeter of the parcel, with signs at each corner of
the fence stating that the monument was the private property of the
La Crosse Eagles.170 Six months later, the city erected a second iron
fence around the monument.171 This fence was gated, and hanging on
it was a sign that read: “This property is not owned or maintained by
the City of La Crosse, nor does the City endorse the religious expres-
sions thereon.”172 Yet despite all these actions, the court held that the
city had failed to cure the Establishment Clause violation and that a
reasonable observer could still conclude that the city was sponsoring
the monument.173
165. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 870 (2005).
166. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010).
167. Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 276 F. Supp. 2d 961 (W.D. Wis., 2003), rev’d Mercier
v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
168. Id. at 963.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 965.
172. Id. at 965–66.
173. Id. at 975.
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The Mercier court acknowledged that the disclaimer sign might
prevent a newcomer to La Crosse from perceiving any city endorse-
ment of the religious message.174 The problem, however, laid with the
city’s long-time residents. According to the court, those residents
would know about the city’s relationship with the monument, its de-
sire to keep the monument on city property, and its efforts to resist
removal of the monument.175
When it comes to a government-ordered dismantling of a long-
standing religious symbol used to commemorate a non-religious event,
such as the wartime sacrifices of military veterans, the question arises
as to which is the greater violation of the Establishment Clause—the
maintenance of a privately-built religious symbol on government prop-
erty, or the intentional government destruction of a symbol of a partic-
ular religion’s beliefs. When government categorically takes action
that sends a message of disapproval of private religion, the Establish-
ment Clause is violated. When government publicly targets religious
expression made decades earlier by private individuals, the free exer-
cise of religion is targeted.
With all the unanswered questions left from American Legion, not
to mention the narrowness of the holding, there could still be many
instances in which even a passive religious display might be seen in
violation of the Establishment Clause. Therefore, to preserve free ex-
ercise, if a symbol is found to violate the Establishment Clause be-
cause it might not meet all the specific guidelines of American Legion,
it should be offered to a private group before any dismantling occurs.
To do otherwise would be to risk a Free Exercise infringement, which
the Establishment Clause should never be used to do. Because the
First Amendment religion clauses are all about religious liberty, the
174. Id. at 978–79.
175. Id.
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Establishment Clause should not be applied in ways that diminish the
scope of that liberty.176
176. Since the First Amendment is all about liberty, the Free Exercise Clause is the
primary of the two religion clauses. As scholars have noted, religious liberty was
“the only concern of the authors of the religion clause.” Stephen L. Carter, Reflec-
tions on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 309 (2002).
Consequently, the Free Exercise Clause, which directly protects religious liberty,
is the primary clause within the First Amendment. As Professor Dent argues,
“[o]ne can justify a greater sensitivity to establishment claims than to free exer-
cise claims only if the religion clauses are viewed as promoting secularism.”
George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public
School Students, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 707, 719 (1993). Given the primacy of
the Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment hierarchy, the Establishment
Clause occupies a subordinate position. Consequently, the Establishment Clause
can never negate the Free Exercise Clause. Often, however, the Establishment
Clause has been at the focal point of First Amendment jurisprudence. But this is
just the opposite of what should be the case. Nearly every member of the Court
over the course of the development of the Court’s establishment clause jurispru-
dence has subscribed to some form of the principle that even without any mate-
rial aid to religion, government endorsement of religion will at some point
constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause. See Thomas R. McCoy, supra
note 106, at 553. Indeed, free exercise seems “to have been left on the sidelines of
the rights revolution. Mary Ann Glendon, Law, Communities and the Religious
Freedom Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 672, 678 (1992). It
has taken somewhat of a beating from judges who have given an expansive inter-
pretation to the notion of ‘establishment,’ while at the same time ignoring the
restrictions being inflicted “on the associational aspects of free exercise.” Id.
(highlighting the claim being made that, for the sake of avoiding the establish-
ment of religion, Americans must surrender some of their rights regarding the
free exercise of religion). It has become common for the Court “to trump free exer-
cise claims with findings of religious establishment.” Reading Zelman, supra note
128, at 1145. As applied by the Court, “the Establishment Clause did not expand
the legitimate claims of religious people; it worked to diminish them.” Id. at 1146.
Thus, the constitutionally “privileged status of religion [has] been turned into a
disability.” Richard John Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 620, 629 (1992). “When the American people can no longer publicly
express their obligations to the Creator, it is feared that they will no longer ac-
knowledge their obligations to one another—nor to the Constitution in which the
obligations of freedom are enshrined.” Id. at 632.
